Nuova ricerca

Annalisa COLIVA

Professore Associato
Dipartimento Educazione e Scienze Umane

Home | Curriculum(pdf) | Didattica |


Pubblicazioni

2023 - Perception, Justification and Philosophical Truths: A Commentary on Robert Audi’s Seeing, Knowing and Doing: A Perceptualist Account [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

In this commentary, I consider some of the main themes in Robert Audi’s and raise some objections with special reference to Audi’s account of the nature of perception and perceptual justification and his claim that there exist non-trivial, self-evident philosophical truths and principles.

2023 - You just believe that because … it’s a hinge [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

This paper looks at the genealogical challenge encapsulated in the schema “You just believe that because . . .” through the lens of hinge epistemology. It is claimed that hinges are typically held just because one has been brought up to believe them. It is further claimed that, while fitting into the YJBTB schema, hinges are rationally held when different de facto hinges are taken for granted merely because of one’s position in history. Moreover, they are rationally held if they are de jure hinges, constitutive of epistemic rationality. By contrast, holding different de facto hinges, while aware that one’s reasons for them are either question-begging or no stronger than the ones in favor of incompatible ones, is not rational. The latter would be cases of “deep disagreement”—that is, disagreement that is in principle insoluble. Hence, the nature and epistemic significance of the genealogical challenge are clarified.

2023 - “Wittgenstein et le pragmatisme. Réflexions sur Le Doute en question de Claudine Tiercelin” [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

A critical discussion of Claudine Tiercelin, Le doute en question.

2022 - Precis of Relativism [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

Precis of the book by M. Baghramian and A. Coliva Relativism, Routledge, 2020.

2022 - Replies to critics [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

Replies to Koelbel, Boghossian, MacFarlane, and Perez-Navarro

2022 - What philosophical disagreement and philosophical skepticism hinge on [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.; Doulas, L.
abstract

Philosophers disagree. A lot. Pervasive disagreement is part of the territory; consensus is hard to find. Some think this should lead us to embrace philosophical skepticism: skepticism about the extent to which we can know, or justifiably believe, the philosophical views we defend and advance. Most philosophers in the literature fall into one camp or the other: philosophical skepticism or philosophical anti-skepticism. Drawing on the insights of hinge epistemology, this paper proposes another way forward, an intermediate position that appeals both to skeptical and anti-skeptical intuitions concerning the possibility and scope of philosophical knowledge. The main advantage of our account is that it’s able to recover some philosophical knowledge while also being compatible with philosophical skepticism.

2022 - Wittgenstein rehinged [Monografia/Trattato scientifico]
Coliva, A.
abstract

2021 - "I Know", "I know", "I know". Hinge epistemology, invariantism, and skepticism [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, A.
abstract

2021 - Disagreement unhinged, constitutivism style [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.; Palmira, M.
abstract

Hinge epistemology has to dispel the worry that disagreeing over hinges is rationally inert. Building on a companion piece (Coliva and Palmira 2020), this paper offers a constitutivist solution to the problem of rational inertia by maintaining that a Humean sceptic and a hinge epistemologist disagree over the correct explication of the concept of epistemic rationality. The paper explores the implications of such a solution. First, it clarifies in what sense a disagreement over hinges would be a conceptual disagreement. Secondly, it uses considerations about the (alleged) rational inertia of hinge disagreement to offer a test whereby to demarcate genuine hinges from merely entrenched beliefs. Thirdly, it offers a response to the challenge of explaining why we have reason to engage in the epistemic practices that hinges are constitutive of in the first place. Fourthly, it argues that the constitutivist approach to hinge disagreement does not result in a relativist view.

2021 - Doubts, philosophy and therapy [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

There is nowadays a tendency, to be dated back to Gordon Baker’s reading, to interpret the later Wittgenstein as proposing a thoroughly therapeutic view of philosophy. Accordingly, he was not dealing with philosophical problems to show how they originated in a misunderstanding of our language. For that would have presupposed his advancing theses about how language works. Rather, his therapeutic method was in the service of liberating philosophers from the kind of intellectual prejudices that would prompt them to ask philosophical questions. The article examines the complex interconnections between Wittgenstein and Waismann to show how the thorough-going therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein proposed by Baker is in fact a projection of Waismann’s ideas onto Wittgenstein. Moreover, by looking at Wittgenstein’s complex anti-skeptical strategies in On Certainty, it shows that his aim was not to provide therapy against philosophers’ inclinations, but to show that skeptical doubts are misguided and nonsensical.

2021 - Stebbing, Moore (and Wittgenstein) on common sense and metaphysical analysis [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

Susan Stebbing is often portrayed as indebted to G. E. Moore for her ideas concerning the relationship between common sense and philosophy and about analysis. By focusing mostly on her article “The method of analysis in metaphysics”, this article argues that, in fact, Stebbing anticipated some of Moore’s ideas in “Proof of an external world”, and even ideas in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. It further argues that Stebbing cast an original light on the method of analysis, while at the same time being much more aware of its limitations than Moore in “A defence of common sense”. In fact, her reservations anticipated some of Wittgenstein’s criticisms, in Philosophical Investigations, of his earlier logical atomism. It is concluded that Stebbing’s paper is a treasure trove of seminal ideas both in metaphysics and in epistemology, the full significance of which is better appreciated by reading it in connection with the work of these founding fathers of analytic philosophy.

2020 - "Skepticism unhinged" [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

2020 - Are there mathematical hinges? [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

In this paper I argue that, contrary to what several prominent scholars of On Certainty have claimed, Wittgenstein did not maintain that simple mathematical propositions like "2 ~ 2 = 4"or "12 ~ 12 = 144,"much like G. E. Moore's truisms, could be examples of hinge propositions. In particular, given his overall conception of mathematics, it was impossible for him to single out these simpler mathematical propositions from the rest of mathematical statements, to reserve only to them a normative function. I then maintain that these mathematical examples were introduced merely as objects of comparison to bring out some peculiar features of the only hinges he countenanced in On Certainty, which were all outside the realm of mathematics. I then close by gesturing at how the distinction between mathematical hinges and non-hinges could be exemplified and by exploring its consequences with respect to (Wittgenstein's) philosophy of mathematics.

2020 - Hinge disagreement [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, A.; Palmira, M.
abstract

A study of how hinge epistemology is compatible with the possibility of disagreement about hinges.

2020 - In Quest of a Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, A.
abstract

Hinge epistemology is a family of theories about justification (and knowledge) which give centre-stage to Wittgenstein’s notion of a “hinge”. In the following, I will first put forward some basic methodological considerations regarding the relationship between merely exegetical work on, in particular, Wittgenstein’s texts, and more theoretically committed work, which aims at developing suggestions that can be found in the texts, even though they are not clearly attributable as such to their author (§1). I will then summarize the main tenets of what, to date, is still the most widespread reading of On Certainty (§2) – the so-called “framework reading”. In light of the initial methodological considerations and of this exegesis of On Certainty, I will then review some contemporary attempts at developing Wittgenstein’s ideas in an anti-skeptical direction, such as Crispin Wright’s, Michael Williams’ and Duncan Pritchard’s (§3). I will argue that, their intrinsic merits notwithstanding, they fail to take proper measure of Wittgenstein’s own position. I will then close by sketching my own version of hinge epistemology and by highlighting points of contact and disagreement with Wittgenstein’s own views as portrayed by the framework reading (§4).

2020 - Relativism [Monografia/Trattato scientifico]
Coliva, A.; Baghramian, M.
abstract

The most up to date reference book on the topic of relativism in philosophy

2019 - Against neo-wittgensteinian entitlements [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, A.
abstract

In this paper I raise some worries against one specific notion of entitlement defended in the last decade mainly by Crispin Wright (but also, in some ways, by Michael Williams). As first proposed, entitlements should be novel kinds of warrant, hereto unknown to epistemological reflection and capable of solving the old and most challenging problem of epistemology—that is, scepticism of both a Cartesian and of a Humean fashion. Furthermore, the notion of entitlement here under consideration is taken to be of Wittgensteinian descent—or so it is argued by its supporters. It would therefore usefully lend itself to an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s ideas in On Certainty. In the first part of the paper, I briefly present Wright’s views. In the second, I show why entitlements cannot be appealed to in the course of a fair rendition of Wittgenstein’s ideas. In the third, I show why, irrespective of their alleged Wittgensteinian lineage, entitlements are highly problematic in their own right.

2019 - Dialetheism in Action: A New Strategy for Solving the Equal Validity Paradox [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, A.; Moruzzi, S.
abstract

This paper starts from the Equal Validity Paradox, a paradoxical argument connected to the so-called phenomenon of faultless disagreement. It is argued that there are at least six strategies for solving the paradox. After presenting the first five strategies and their main problems, the paper focuses on the sixth strategy which rejects the assumption that every proposition cannot be both true a false. Dialetheism is the natural candidate for developing strategy six. After presenting strategy six in detail, we formulate a normative problem for the dialetheist and offer a tentative solution to it. We then elaborate further considerations connecting strategy six to pluralism about truth and logic. Even if strategy six is a hard path to take, its scrutiny highlights some important points on truth, logic and the norms for acceptance and rejection.

2019 - Disagreeing with myself: doxastic commitments and intrapersonal disagreement [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

This paper explores the idea of disagreement with oneself, in both its diachronic and synchronic forms. A puzzling case of synchronic intrapersonal disagreement is presented and the paper considers its implications. One is that belief is a genus that comes in two species: as disposition and as commitment. Another is that self-deception consists in a conflict between one's beliefs as dispositions and one's beliefs as commitments. Synchronic intrapersonal disagreement also has implications for the condition that needs to be fulfilled in order to have genuine disagreement tout court, and for the different ways in which it can be satisfied.

2019 - Hinges, radical skepticism and alethic pluralism [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, A.
abstract

In this paper, I respond to criticisms raised to my version of hinge epistemology in three contributions to the present volume. Namely, Luca Zanetti’s paper on “Inescapable hinges. Steps towards a transcendental hinge epistemology”, Natalie Ashton’s on “Extended rationality and epistemic relativism”, and Sebastiano Moruzzi’s on “Hinge epistemology and alethic pluralism”.

2019 - Précis [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

The paper is a précis of my The Varieties of Self-Knowledge (Palgrave, 2016)

2019 - Relativism and hinge epistemology [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, A.
abstract

This is a survey of different versions of hinge epistemology and their commitment to relativism either of difference or of disagreement, It concludes that on most interpretations of Wittgenstein's On Certainty, there is no commitment to either, although on some interpretations there may be a commitment to the former; and that most contemporary versions of hinge epistemology are not committed to either.

2019 - Replies to commentators [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

This paper contains the replies to five commentators (Borgoni, Pedrini, McGlynn, Parent, Zimmerman) on my book The Varieties of Self-Knowledge.

2019 - Testimonial hinges [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

An extension of hinge epistemology to testimony .

2019 - Waismann on belief and knowledge [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, A.
abstract

A study of two postumous papers by F. Waismann on belief and knowledge and their relationship with Wittgenstein's later philosophy.

2018 - Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History [Curatela]
Coliva, A.; Leonardi, P.; Moruzzi, S.
abstract

The volume contains 18 papers related to Eva Picardi's work. It is divided in three sections: one on Frege's philosophy of maths and language, one on themes from Donald Davidson, and one on linguistic competence and semantic contextualism

2018 - Introduction [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, A.; Leonardi, P.; Moruzzi, S.
abstract

2018 - Moore and Mooreanism [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, A.
abstract

The paper presents G. E. Moore's strategies against skepticism and the main interpretations they have been subject to in the last 40 years.

2018 - Practical knowledge and linguistic competence [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, A.
abstract

I begin by introducing the distinction between practical and propositional (or theoretical) knowledge. Then I consider some objections to it, with special attention to the ones put forward by Stanley and Williamson. Afterwards, I briefly summarize Chomsky’s position on linguistic competence—a position that, as mentioned, is based on the idea that linguistic competence consists in propositional knowledge. Finally, I criticize both the theoretical and the empirical arguments Chomsky puts forward in favor of his view and present some observations in favor of the idea that linguistic competence is ultimately practical.

2018 - Self-knowing interpreters [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, A.
abstract

The paper illustrates and clarifies the distinction between first-personal and third-personal self-knowledge. It is argued that the characteristic traits of first-personal self-knowledge are groundlessness, transparency and authority. It is maintained that of each of these characteristics is a necessary and a priori aspect of first-personal self-knowledge. The thesis that there is first-personal self-knowledge is then defended from challenges coming from cognitive science, which are taken to show that we may fail to know dispositional (sometimes causal) elements of our mental states. Yet, this does not impugn the fact that, regarding the non-dispositional aspects of our mental life, we can and do have first-personal knowledge of them. It is then argued that third-personal self-knowledge is achieved through a plurality of methods, which vary from inference to the best explanation, to induction, simulation, testimony and hermeneutics. The relevant self-ascriptions are therefore neither groundless, nor transparent or authoritative and are the result of substantive cognitive achievements.

2018 - Strange bedfellows: on Pritchard’s disjunctivist hinge epistemology [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

The paper discusses some themes in Duncan Pritchard’s last book, Epistemic Angst. Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. It considers it in relation to other forms of Wittgenstein-inspired hinge-epistemology. It focuses, in particular, on the proposed treatment of Closure in relation to entailments containing hinges, the treatment of Underdetermination-based skeptical paradox and the avail to disjunctivism to respond to the latter. It argues that, although bold and thought-provoking, the mix of hinge epistemology and disjunctivism Pritchard proposes is not motivated.

2018 - The Gettier problem and context [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, A.; Belleri, D.
abstract

The relationship between contextualism and Gettier cases is controversial. Yet, David Lewis, in his influential “Elusive Knowledge”, links his contextualist thoughts to the discussion of some standard Gettier cases. This chapter explores the question whether contextualism can provide a satisfactory account of Gettier scenarios. We compare a contextualist account of lottery cases and of fake-barn cases (which Lewis seems to regard as very close to Gettier examples) with a contextualist account of standard Gettier problems. We conclude that contextualism may at best provide a partial reconstruction and explanation of the problem underlying Gettier scenarios.

2018 - What Do Philosophers Do? Maddy, Moore and Wittgenstein [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

The paper discusses and presents an alternative interpretation to Penelope Maddy’s reading of G.E. Moore’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategies as proposed in her book What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy. It connects this discussion with the methodological claims Maddy puts forward and offers an alternative to her therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty.

2018 - What anti-realism about hinges could possibly be? [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, A.
abstract

The paper addresses the issue of what epistemic anti-realism could possibly be, in the context of “hinge epistemology.” According to this new epistemological trend, justification depends on evidence together with general background assumptions—for example, that there is an external world, that our sense organs are mostly reliable, that we are not the victims of persistent and lucid dreams what has regularly happened in the past will happen in the future, that people are generally reliable informants, and so on. The paper then addresses two issues. First, whether these assumptions are arbitrary, as relativists would claim. Second, how we should conceive of their metaphysical status. It responds negatively to the first question and puts forward an anti-realist conception of hinges to respond to the latter. Central to the proposal is that the kind of truth that can be predicated of hinges is of a minimalist kind. The paper also explores the compatibility of minimalism about hinges' truth and alethic pluralism .

2018 - Wittgenstein, self-knowledge and nature [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, A.
abstract

The aim of this chapter is to explore Wittgenstein’s suggestive remarks about self-knowledge—that is, our knowledge of our own mental states—and their connection with naturalism. As is well known, Wittgenstein was critical of naturalizing the epistemology of mind in behaviourist or in more physicalist-oriented terms. Yet, he placed great emphasis on the role of instinctive and natural manifestations of our own mental states. These natural manifestations were necessary, in his opinion, to acquire the relevant psychological concepts and thereby get in a position to give new expression to our mental states through language. Furthermore, he thought that these verbal manifestations would become “second nature” to us. So much so, that just as it would not make sense to regard a spontaneous cry out of fear as based on having that emotion in view and on giving expression to it through the cry, he thought that at least some of our psychological “avowals” should not be considered as judgements based on, and justified by having the relevant mental states in view. Rather, he thought they should be seen as immediate and spontaneous, though culturally ingrained, expressions of the mental states that elicited them. A fortiori, in his view, psychological avowals properly so regarded should not be considered as the result of inference to the best explanation starting from the observation of one’s overt behaviour. Wittgenstein put his own variety of naturalism at the service of dissolving—rather than solving—the very problem of self-knowledge. Thus, Wittgenstein is rightly considered the father of both contemporary expressivism and of constitutivism regarding psychological avowals. In particular, his remarks can be seen at the origin of the idea—central to contemporary expressivism—that the main function of (at least some of) our psychological avowals is expressive rather than descriptive. Contemporary expressivists, however, have also tried to move away from Wittgenstein’s anti-epistemological outlook. Contemporary constitutivists, by contrast, are united in rejecting the idea that, at least in some central cases, our psychological self-ascriptions are underwritten by an appropriate epistemic relation linking the subject and her first-order mental states, such that the former can actually be taken to manifest true and appropriately justified beliefs about one’s own mental states. Constitutivists, however, are critical of the idea that the relevant self-ascriptions serve merely an expressive function and that they replace forms of more instinctive behaviour. Wittgenstein was well aware of the limitations of his own expressivist position. He was very careful—indeed much more careful than several contemporary expressivist theorists—not to over-generalize the expressivist treatment. For he was very mindful of the fact that exactly the same twists of phrase could sometimes be used to express judgments about our own first-order mental states and that, in those cases, they would manifest a subject’s own beliefs regarding her first-order mental states, reached through a variety of epistemic methods, all open to error, at least in principle. Hence, just as much as he can rightly be seen as the ancestor of contemporary expressivism and constitutivism with respect to self-knowledge, he should actually be seen as the father of contemporary pluralism regarding self-knowledge as well.

2018 - Wittgenstein: language, practical knowledge and embodiment [Curatela]
Coliva, A.
abstract

This special issue of Rivista italiana di filosofia del linguaggio is devoted to the reception and development of Wittgenstein's ideas with respect to language, embodiment and practical knowledge. It contains 10 papers on enactivism, langauge acquistion, dispositions and abilities, and the application of these notions to reading and dancing

2017 - Epistemic Pluralism [Curatela]
Coliva, A.
abstract

The volume investigates various forms of epistemic pluralism - about knowledge, justification, warrant - and their bearings on various philosophical topics, such as skepticism, disagreement and self-knowledge.

2017 - How to be a pluralist about self-knowledge [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, A.
abstract

The paper presents an original form of pluralism about self-knowledge - that is, about knowledge of our own mental states - and situates it in the larger debate about epistemic pluralism

2017 - Introduction [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

2017 - Introduction [Epistemic pluralism] [Prefazione o Postfazione]
Coliva, A.
abstract

The Introduction presents the topic of epistemic pluralism, it argues for its relevance in epistemology and situates the papers contained in the volume.

2017 - Précis of Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

The paper presents the main theses of my monograph Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology

2017 - Replies to commentators [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

The paper contains the replies to the comments made by Alan Millar, Yuval Avnur, Giorgio Volpe, and Maria Baghramian on my Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology. It addresses, in particular, the nature of perceptual justification, the truth of hinges, my response to Humean skepticism and the issue of epistemic relativism.

2017 - Rituals, Philosophy, Science, and Progress: Wittgenstein on Frazer [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, A.
abstract

The paper presents and discusses Wittgenstein's anti-scientism with respect to anthropology and philosophy, by focussing on his Remarks on Frazer's the Golden Bough.

2017 - Stopping points: ‘I’, immunity and the real guarantee [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The aim of the paper is to bring out exactly what makes first-personal (and more generally indexical and demonstrative) contents special, by showing that they perform a distinctive cognitive function. Namely, they are stopping points of inquiry. First, I articulate this idea and then I use it to clear the ground from a troublesome conflation. That is, the conflation of this particular function all first-person thoughts have with the property of immunity to error through misidentification, which only some I-thoughts enjoy. Afterward, I show the implications of this idea for a theory of first-person content and of immunity to error though misidentification. I then make some comparisons with Pryor’s notion of wh-misidentification and immunity thereof and with Cappelen and Dever’s position on immunity to error through misidentification and show why they are defective.

2016 - Hinge Epistemology [Curatela]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The book explores the history and theoretical developments of a new epistemological trend - "hinge epistemology" - which originates in the works of G. E. Moore and L. Wittgenstein, and which is gaining center stage in contemporary debates.

2016 - How to perceive reasons [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper addresses the issue of how we should conceive of the content of experience in order for experiences to play a justificatory role.

2016 - I: an essential indexical? [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

L'articolo presenta e discute criticamente due recenti volumi sul tema della prima persona: H. Cappellen e J. Divers*The Inessential Indexical* e Christopher Peacocke *The Mirror of the World*.

2016 - Introduction: Hinge Epistemology [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.; Moyal-Sharrock, D.
abstract

This introduction gives a summary of the content of the special issue Hinge Epistemology, grouping the papers in three sections: (1) more exegetical accounts of Wittgenstein's notion of hinge certainties and their bearing on a theory of justification and knowledge as well as on the topic of external world scepticism; (2) papers critical of the very notion of hinge certainty; and (3) papers that apply the notion to various areas of epistemology and compare Wittgenstein's views to those of other philosophers.

2016 - The Varieties of Self-Knowledge [Monografia/Trattato scientifico]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Il volume presenta una posizione pluralista riguardo al tema della conoscenza dei nostri stati mentali (sensazioni, emozioni, percezioni, atteggiamenti proposizionali, ecc.). Distingue tra conoscenza in prima e in terza persona dei nostri stati mentali. Difende l'idea che vi siano un pluralità di metodi di conoscenza di sé in terza persona (dall'inferenza alla spiegazione migliore, all'induzione e alla simulazione, dalla testimonianza alla "ermeneutica"). Analizza quindi una serie di modelli epistemici recenti usati per spiegare la conoscenza di sé in prima persona (dall'affidabilismo, alle teorie di Burge, Peacocke e Moran fino all'espressivismo di Bar-On) e sostiene che non rendono conto dei tratti distintivi di quest'ultima e che solo un modello costitutivista possa farlo. Il modello costitutivista stesso, però, viene declinato diversamente a seconda del tipo di stato mentale cui si applica. Nel corso della discussione si affronta il tema del paradosso di Moore ("P ma non credo che P") e della rilevanza dei recenti studi empirici sul fallimento della conoscenza dei nostri stati mentali. In particolare, si sostiene che essi mostrano solo che molto spesso conosciamo noi stessi in terza persona e i metodi che utilizziamo possono fallire; non che non vi sia mai conoscenza di sé in prima persona.

2016 - Which hinge epistemology? [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper presents various kinds of "hinge epistemology"--that is, a theory of justification and knowledge which builds on Wittgenstein's notion of "hinge propositions"--and argues in favor of one particular version of it.

2015 - "Pragmatics and testimony" [WORKSHOP] [Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Il workshop, che ha visto la partecipazioni di numerosi ospiti internazionali, selezionati anche attraverso una call for papers, ha dato l'opportunità di indagare il tema della testimonianza, intesa in senso ampio come informazione ricevuta da altri, nei suoi risvolti pragmatici ed epistemici.

2015 - Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology [Monografia/Trattato scientifico]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The book proposes a novel account of perceptual justification, indebted to Wittgenstein's idea that justifaction always takes place within a system of assumptions, which play the role of hinges for our empirical inquiries. It shows how it can be coupled with an anti-sceptical strategy, whereby epistemic rationality extends to its conditions of possibility as well as to justified propositions. It shows why endorsing a hinge epistemology should not lead to epistemic relativism. It then shows how these views can be extended beyond the case of perceptual justification, to the cases of testimonial justification, justification of basic logical laws, and hinges such as "there is a past", "there are other minds" and the Principle of the uniformity of nature.

2015 - How to commit Moore's paradox [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper argues for a new interpretation of Moore's paradox, which hinges on the idea of beliefs as commitments vs as mere dispostions. It also presents a criticism of previous accounts of Moore's paradox and defends the proposed solution from several possible objections.

2015 - Introduzione [Lo scetticismo] [Breve Introduzione]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Questa introduzione presenta due versioni di paradosso scettico - quella cartesiana e quella humeana - e analizza i principali tentativi di soluzione avanzati nell'ambito dell'epistemologia contemporanea.

2015 - Iride [Direzione o Responsabilità Riviste]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

2015 - Knowledge Dissemination in the Digital Era. Language and Episteme [CONVEGNO] [Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Il convegno, che ha visto la partecipazione di moltissimi ospiti di fama internazionale, selezionati anche in parte attraverso una call for papers, ha dato l'opportunità di indagare il tema della disseminazione della conoscenza nell'era digitale, sviscerandone gli aspetti linguistici ed epistemologici.

2015 - Knowledge Dissemination in the Digital Era. Language and Episteme. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. 18-20 October, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia. Italy [Altro]
Bondi, Marina; Cacchiani, Silvia; Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT AND CALL FOR PAPERS The CLAVIER group at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia and LUIQ Lund are currently organizing a conference on KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION IN THE DIGITAL ERA: LANGUAGE AND EPISTEME (KDDE), Modena, 18 - 20 November 2015. The conference brings together know-how and expertize from philosophy (social epistemology), information technology and (applied) linguistics to cast new light on the link between knowledge dissemination strategies as devices for recontextualization and reconceptualization, and credibility and trust generation in selected research blogs, online reference works (e.g. free, also non-institutional, encyclopedias), websites such as Academia.edu, search engines (notably, Google), etc. (See below for more on the conference.) CONFERENCE DESCRIPTION Knowledge construction and knowledge dissemination are key to the socio-economic development of contemporary society and the cultural growth of EU citizens. More particularly, knowledge dissemination in the digital world is now making a significant move from traditional genres to new forms of web-mediated communication. This, however, leaves many open questions about the whys and wherefores of relevance and credibility, trust and reputation, effective and efficient linguistic choices, and multimodal communication. We therefore bring together know-how and expertize from philosophy (social epistemology), information technology and (applied) linguistics to cast new light on the link between knowledge dissemination strategies as devices for recontextualization and reconceptualization, and credibility and trust generation in selected research blogs, online reference works (e.g. free, also non-institutional, encyclopedias), websites such as Academia.edu, search engines (notably, Google), etc. Using the tools of corpus linguistics and genre studies, linguists will concentrate on linguistic and multimodal knowledge dissemination strategies that may improve or undermine the transfer of high-quality information (research results) to peers and professionals, as well as to different types of lay-audiences in highly asymmetric contexts (e.g. children). From a complementary perspective, philosophers will concentrate on epistemic reputation and objective selection of websites, and on the subsequent inclusion of relevant high-quality information. Third, the contribution of information technology will allow investigation into issues such as algorithms for website selection and listing by search engines (Google.com), as well as reflection on document and web-page design. INVITED PLENARY SPEAKERS: Linguistic strand: Naomi Baron – American U, Washington, USA; Anna Mauranen ? U of Helsinki, Finland; Cornelius Puschmann ? U of Friedrichshafen, Germany; Josef Schmied - Chemnitz U of Technology, Germany; Marina Sbisà/Paolo Labinaz - U of Trieste, Italy; Rita Cucchiara - U of Modena; Stefano Ossicini - U of Modena. Social epistemology strand: Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij – U of Kent, UK; Catherine Felix – Lund U, Sweden; Elisabeth Fricker, Oxford U, UK; Emmanuel Genot – Lund U, Sweden; Magnus Jiborn - Lund U, Sweden; Erik Olson - Lund University, Sweden; Gloria Origgi - Institut Jean Nicod, CNRS, France; Rasmus Rendsvig – Lund U; Judith Simon – U of Vienna, Austria, U of Copenhagen, Denmark; Ylva von Gerber – Lund U, Sweden. WORKING LANGUAGE: English.

2015 - Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium [Curatela]
Moyal Sharrock, D.; Munz, V.; Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The volume contains most invited papers to the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein's Society Symposium in Kirchberg 2013 "Mind, Language and Action". They are divided into four sections: Wittgenstein, Enactivism, Language Acquisition, Action

2015 - Pluralism workshop 1: Truth, logic and ontology [WORKSHOP] [Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Il workshop, con numerosi ospiti di fama internazionale, ha dato l'opportunità di approfondire il tema del pluralismo nelle sue numerosi declinazioni, con particolare riguardo alla filosofia del linguaggio, la logica e la filosofia della matematica.

2015 - Pluralism workshop 2: Pluralism and normativity [WORKSHOP] [Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Il workshop, cui hanno partecipato numerosi ospiti di fama internazionale, ha dato modo di indagare i risvolti del pluralismo da un punto di vista normativo, con particolare riguardo alle nozioni di verità e credenza, nonché le applicazioni del pluralismo all'epistemologia del mentale e in filosofia della logica e della matematica.

2015 - Relativismo e differenza chez Wittgenstein [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Il saggio affronta il tema del presunto relativismo sia concettuale sia epistemico nel pensiero del secondo Wittgenstein. Sostiene che la posizione di Wittgenstein non sia genuinamente relativista e che sia più corretto interpretarla come una forma di antirealismo.

2015 - Teorie della conoscenza. Il dibattito contemporaneo [Curatela]
Calabi, Clotilde; Coliva, Annalisa; Sereni, Andrea; Volpe, Giorgio
abstract

Il volume costituisce la prima antologia di testi tradotti in lingua italiana dei principali saggi di filosofia analitica in teoria della conoscenza. E' diviso in tre parti: conoscenza, giustificazione e scetticismo e contiene testi di L. BonJour, K. DeRose, F. Dretske, R. Firth, E. Gettier, A. Goldman, J. Greco, C.I. Lewis, R. Nozick, D. Pritchard, J. Pryor, E. Sosa, T. Williamson, C. Wright. Ogni sezione è preceduta da un'ampia introduzione.

2015 - Wittgenstein su rito, filosofia, scienza e progresso. Quattro temi a partire dalle Note sul Ramo d’oro di Frazer [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Il paper presenta quattro temi al centro delle Note sul Ramo d'oro di Frazer di Ludwig Wittgenstein, segnatamente rito, filosofia, scienza e progresso, e ne mostra le complesse connessioni.

2014 - Achilles, the tortoise and hinge epistemology for basic logical laws [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Il paper, scritto in onore di Pascal Engel, prende spunto dal noto puzzle di Lewis Carroll su ciò che la tartaruga ha veramente detto ad Achille. Quindi presenta un nuovo resoconto dello statuto epistemologico delle leggi logiche fondamentali (come ad esempio il modus ponens) ispirato alla concezione wittgensteiniana delle proposizioni cardine in epistemologia e fa vedere come questa soluzione possa offrire una soluzione al puzzle di Lewis Carroll.

2014 - Basic disagreement, basic contextualism and basic relativism [Relazione in Atti di Convegno]
Coliva, Annalisa; S., Moruzzi
abstract

The paper shows how basic forms of semantic contextualism and of alethic relativism cannot account for an intuitive and straightforward notion of disagreement, which characterizes those disputes of inclination that have been claimed to be better accounted for by those theories.

2014 - Epistemology [Capitolo/Saggio]
Maria Cristina, Amoretti; Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The chapter analyses the main topics in contemporary epistemology.

2014 - Faultless disagreement and the equal validity paradox [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa; S., Moruzzi
abstract

The paper takes for granted the existence of falutless disagreement in certain areas of discourse having to do with expression of taste and further personal inclinations. It shows that, in connection with the relativist idea that opposite stances, in these areas of discourse, are equally valid, it gives rise to a paradox. It proposes eight ways out of the paradox and shows why each of these is problematic.

2014 - Il disaccordo [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

L'articolo presenta la sezione "Nodi" della rivista, dedicata al tema del disaccordo. Ne fanno parte i contributi di 1) Max Koelbel e di 2) Annalisa Coliva e di Sebastiano Moruzzi sul disaccordo nelle aree del discorso riguardanti inclinazioni personali e delle semantiche che sono compatibili con esso, di 3) Martin Kusch sul disaccordo religioso in Wittgenstein, di 4) Klemens Kappel (et al.) sul ruolo del disaccordo all'interno di una democrazia liberale e di 5) Michele Palmira sul ruolo del disaccordo in filosofia.

2014 - Introduction. The disagreement [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.
abstract

2014 - Moderatism, transmission failures, closure and Humean scepticism [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper argues for a novel account of the structure of empirical justification, alternative to Wright's and Pryor's, called "moderatism", and shows how it can deal with external world scepticism.

2014 - Review of Jordi Fernandez "Transparent Minds", Oxford University Press [Recensione in Rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

This is a review of Fernandez' new book on self-knowledge. It contains a description and an assessment of the volume.

2014 - Rules, Reason and Self-Knowledge [Recensione in Rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The review presents and critically discusses Julia Tanney's "Rules, reason and self-knowledge".

2014 - Wittgenstein, forms and styles of life [WORKSHOP] [Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Il workshop, con ospiti di fama internazionale, ha dato l'opportunità di indagare la complessa nozione di "forma di vita" (Lebensform) elaborata da Ludwog Wittgenstein a partire dalle Ricerche filosofiche, di valutarne le implicazioni per il problema del significato e la rilevanza nell'ambito della teoria della conoscenza.

2014 - Workshop in honor of François Recanati [WORKSHOP] [Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Il workshop, con la partecipazione di François Recanati e di numerosi ospiti di fama internazionale, ha dato l'opportunità di approfondire temi della riflessione di Recanati nell'ambito della filosofia del linguaggio e della mente, con particolare riguardo ai rapporti tra semantica e pragmatica incentrati sulla sua teoria contestualista, e all'idea di file mentali

2013 - About the origins of objectivity [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, A.; Leonardi, P.
abstract

Annalisa Coliva and Paolo Leonardi discuss Tyler Burge's monumental Origins of Objectivity. After presenting its main theses, they critically examine Burge's notions of representation, a priori norms, and thought. Finally, they explore their bearing on various cognitive and epistemological issues, such as the nature of perceptual content, the function of memory and attention in perception, the difference between non propositional and propositional thought and the role of perceptions in justifying our beliefs.

2013 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel [CONVEGNO] [Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa; Danièle Moyal, Sharrock; Volker, Munz
abstract

36° simposio della Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society a Kirchberg am Wechsel. Temi: Laguage, Mind and Action.

2013 - Dal senso ai sensi... e ritorno [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

L'articolo analizza il problema della natura del senso di termini indicali e dimostrativi, all'interno di una prospettiva latamente fregeana, aperta all'apporto della recente riflessione filosofica sulla natura del contenuto percettivo e avanza una proposta originale.

2013 - Hinges and Certainty. A Précis of Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

In this paper I present and develop the reading of so-called 'hinge propositions' in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* already advanced in my *Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense* (Palgrave, 2010). I also draw out its consequences for a number of issues, such as Wittgenstein's anti-skeptical strategies and whether our basic certainties are effable as such.

2013 - Mind, Meaning and Knowledge. Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright [Curatela]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

A collective volume, containing thirteen original essays on several aspects of Crispin Wright's philosophy, focusing, in particular, on rule-following, self-knowledge, pluralism, relativism and epistemology. It contains a substantial Introduction by A. Coliva and Wright's replies to contributors.

2013 - Moore's proof, liberals and conservatives. Is there a (Wittgensteinian) third way? [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

It is argued that a third position, called 'moderatism', alternative to both liberalism and conservativism about the structure of empirical justification, should be countenanced. It is then shown how moderatism could be of help to shed light on the phenomenon of transmission failure, its relationship with the principle of Closure and to provide a novel diagnosis of the failure of Moore's proof. Its relationships with Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* are also explored.

2013 - Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? [Recensione in Rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

I provide an overview and assessment of the essays contained in the volume

2013 - Recensione di Nicla Vassallo *Per sentito dire. Conoscenza e testimonianza* [Recensione in Rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Il libro riassume e discute i principali temi del libro di Nicla Vassallo *Per sentito dire. Conoscenza e testimonianza*

2013 - Replies [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

In this contribution I reply to commentators for the book symposium on my *Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense* (Palgrave 2010). Namely, D. Moyal-Sharrock, Cameron Boult and Duncan Pritchard, Martin Kusch, Paolo Tripodi and Paolo Leonardi.

2013 - Rifaj Epistemology workshop [WORKSHOP] [Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Il workshop, organizzato nella forma junior-senior debate, ha dato la possibilità di indagare numerosi temi di teoria della conoscnza, dal ruolo della percezione nella conoscenza, alla natura della conoscenza stessa, nonché il problema dello scetticismo

2013 - Scepticism and knowledge: Moore's proof of an external world [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

L'articolo presenta ed esamina la prova del mondo esterno di G. E. Moore alla luce delle interpretazioni più significative che ne sono state date dalla sua apparizione (1939) ad oggi.

2013 - Self-knowledge [Voce in Dizionario o Enciclopedia]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Questa voce presenta e discute le più importanti teorie filosofiche contemporanee sulla conoscenza dei nostri stati mentali

2013 - Some observations on François Recanati's Mental Files [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa; D., Belleri
abstract

The paper focuses on the very notion of a mental file and on the proposed features of the SELF file and it raises some critical points.

2013 - Sulle origine dell'oggettività [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

L'articolo fornisce una presentazione e una discussione del monumentale *Origins of objectivity* di Tyler Burge.

2012 - Critical notice of Tyler Burge's Origins of Objectivity [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper provides a presentation and critical assessment of Tyler Burge's monumental *Origins of Objectivity*

2012 - Epistemologia (o della conoscenza) [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa; M. C., Amoretti
abstract

Il contributo offre una panoramica e alcuni spunti originali sui temi dello scetticismo e della conoscenza riguardo al mondo esterno.

2012 - European Epistemology Network Meeting [MEETING] [Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa; Paolo, Leonardi; Giorgio, Volpe; Sebastiano, Moruzzi; Bagnoli, Carla; Michele, Palmira
abstract

Incontro annuale dell'European Epistemology Network Modena - Bologna 28-30 giugno 2012

2012 - Human diagrammatic reasoning and seeing-as [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper argues that a fundamental experience necessary to prove theorems in Euclidean geometry is that of "seeing something as". It provides an account of it and draws some consequences about the vexed issue of the analytic/synthetic, a priori/a posteriori status of geometry. In particular, it argues for the view that it is, after all, a priori and analytic.

2012 - Introduction [Mind, Meaning and Knowledge] [Breve Introduzione]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

This Introduction places the 13 essays contained in the volume into the context of Wright's own ideas and their development over his career, with special attention to the following themes: rule-following, self-knowledge, relativism, pluralism, epistemology.

2012 - Introduction [Skepticism and Justification] [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa; Moruzzi, Sebastiano; Volpe, Giorgio
abstract

The Introduction presents the content of the special issue of Synthese on "Skepticism and justification" placing the papers in the wider context of the on-going debate on these issues.

2012 - Introduction [The Self and Self-Knowledge] [Breve Introduzione]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Questa introduzione colloca i 13 saggi del volume nel contesto del dibattito recente sul tema dell'io e della conoscenza dei nostri stati mentali

2012 - Knowledge and Justification [Curatela]
Coliva, Annalisa; S., Moruzzi; G., Volpe
abstract

This special issue contains some prominent contributions on the theory of knowledge, the problem of scepticism and of peer disagreement.

2012 - One variety of self-knowledge: constitutivism as constructivism [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper defends a new form of constitutivism about self-knowledge - called "constructivism" - and argues that since it can be applied only to some mental states, a pluralistic account of self-knowledge should be countenenced.

2012 - Percepire le ragioni? [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

In questo articolo si analizza la discussione degli ultimi decenni circa la possibilità che le percezioni , come tali, giustifichino le credenze empiriche che su di esse si basano. Lo si fa seguendo due linee guida fondamentali: il tema della natura del contenuto percettivo e quello della natura delle giustificazioni. Partendo dall'attacco di Sellars al "mito del dato", si esaminano le posizioni di Davidson, McDowell, Peacocke e Burge. Si sostiene, da un lato, che anche creature prive di concetti possono avere percezioni; e, dall'altro, che solo quando queste ultime sono concettualizzate possono, come tali, giustificare le credenze empiriche corrispondenti.

2012 - Relativismo e multiculturalismo [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa; Palmira, Michele
abstract

Il saggio propone una ricostruzione di alcune tipi di relativismo filosofico e ne sonda le conseguenze per la comprensione del multiculturalismo

2012 - Scetticismo. Dubbio, paradosso e conoscenza [Monografia/Trattato scientifico]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Il libro presenta il problema dello scetticismo riguardo all'esistenza del mondo esterno, enucleandone le due versioni più potenti mai formulate. A dire: lo scetticismo cartesiano e humeano. Analizza quindi le risposte che ne sono state date nella letteratura filosofica contemporanea e ne propone una nuova.

2012 - Skepticism and Justification [Curatela]
Coliva, Annalisa; S., Moruzzi; G., Volpe
abstract

This special issue of Synthese, titled "Skepticism and justification", contains a substantial Introduction (by Coliva, Moruzzi and Volpe), and 9 papers on topics researched by Coliva, Pritchard, Wedgwood, Avnur, Volpe, Dodd, Millar, Gerken, Kallestrup.

2012 - The Self and Self-Knowledge [Curatela]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The volume contains thirteen essays by some of the most prominent philosophers world-wide on the interrelated topics of the nature of the self and the problem of self-knowledge, i.e. of our knowledge of our own minds.

2012 - Truth-relativists can't trump moral progress [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa; S., Moruzzi
abstract

The paper argues that truth-relativists can't make sense of the idea of moral progress, not even by resorting to the notion of trumping.

2012 - Varieties of failure (of warrant transmission--what else?!) [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper argues that a new kind of transmission failure, besides C. Wright's original one and alternative to M. Davies', should be countenanced. It is then shown how it combines with Wright's and why, even if it leads to the failure of the Principle of Closure, it doesn't lead to pernicious consequences.

2012 - Which key to all mythologies about the self? A note on the illusions of transcendence and where they come from [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper provides a novel account of immunity to error through misidentification of psychological, immediate, self-ascriptions, which vindicates Sydney Shoemaker's idea that they involve a kind of immunity which is stronger than the one enjoyed by other kinds of self-ascriptions.

2012 - Which ‘key to all mythologies’ about the self? A note on where the illusions of transcendence come from and how to resist them [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, A.
abstract

It is a striking feature of philosophical reflection on the self that it often ends up being revisionary of our commonsensical intuition that it is identical to a living human being with, intrinsically, physical and psychological properties. As is well known, Descartes identified the self with a mental entity, Hume denied the existence of such an entity and Kant reduced it to a transcendental ego – a mere condition of possibility for experience and thought. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein followed Kant – or, at any rate, the Kant made available to him through reading Schopenhauer – then, later, denied the existence of such an entity and proposed the no-reference view about at least some uses of ‘I’. Finally, Anscombe radicalised Wittgenstein’s views and claimed that no use of ‘I’ is ever referential. It must be acknowledged that, despite the oddity of these views, philosophers have always arrived at their respective positions on the nature of the self through rational reflection: being impressed with some allegedly special feature of the use of ‘I’ (either in speech or in thought), they have felt compelled to account for it by postulating a realm of superentities (or non-entities) which could explain such seeming peculiarities. Confronted with this tradition of revisionary accounts of the self, at least some contemporary theorists are now approaching the issue with a diagnostic eye, trying to identify the features that have led philosophers to embrace such positions, with the aim of offering a better understanding of them that could ‘give philosophy peace’. That is to say, that could make them compatible with the commonsensical view that selves are identical to living human beings and that ‘I’, either in speech or in thought, is a genuinely referential expression.

2011 - Crispin Wright [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa; A., Sereni
abstract

L'articolo presenta la figura e l'opera del filosofo britannico Crispin Wright, con particolare attenzione ai suoi contributi in filosofia del linguaggio, della matematica, in epistemologia e filosofia della mente.

2011 - Intuizioni comode: Sosa tra Moore e Wittgenstein [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa; Palmira, Michele
abstract

L'articolo analizza la posizione recentemente avanzata da Ernest Sosa in merito alla disputa tra G. E. Moore e L. Wittgenstein riguardo alle cosiddette "proposizioni cardine" e critica il suo ricorso alla nozione di intuizione per spiegarne il particolare statuto epistemico.

2011 - Perception Day [WORKSHOP] [Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Una giornata di studio sul tema della percezione e le sue ripercussioni in ambito estetico ed epistemologico con G. Volpe (Bologna), G. Matteucci (Bologna) e C. Calabi (Milano).

2011 - Relativism and Disagreement I [WORKSHOP] [Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

A workshop, held in Bologna May 20-21, 2011, on relativism and disagreement with Italian and international speakers:A. Coliva and S. Moruzzi (Modena and Bologna), Teresa Marques (Lisboa), Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (Barcelona), Delia Belleri (Bologna), Carla Bagnoli (Modena), Michele Palmira (Modena)

2011 - Wittgenstein Day [WORKSHOP] [Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Una giornata di studio su L. Wittgenstein in occasione del 50° anniversario della morte seguita da un simposio sul libro di A. Coliva "Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense (Palgrave 2010), tenuta a Bologna il 23/6/2011, con P. Frascolla (U. Basilicata), P. Tripodi (Torino), L. Perissinotto (Venezia), P. Leonardi (Bologna), W. Cavini (Bologna) e A. Coliva (Modena).

2011 - Wittgenstein out of context [Relazione in Atti di Convegno]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper argues that contemporary interpretations of Wittgenstein's On Certainty as a contextualist manifest, both in philosophy of language and epistemology, are misguided.

2010 - La verità di Rorty tra Vattimo e Marconi [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

L'articolo ripercorre le posizioni ambigue di Rorty sulla verità alla luce delle reazioni di Diego Marconi e Gianni Vattimo emerse al convegno "La filosofia e lo specchio della natura. Trent'anni dopo", svoltosi a Modena nel 2009.

2010 - Moore and Wittgenstein: scepticism, certainty and common sense [Monografia/Trattato scientifico]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The book reconstructs in a historical and theoretical fashion G. E. Moore's and Ludgwig Wittgenstein's contributions to epistemologyas well as the interpretations they have been subject to over the years and proposes a new reading of each.

2010 - Moore's Proof and Martin Davies's epistemic projects [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper argues that Martin Davies's recent distinction between two kinds of transmission failure as well as his distinction between two kinds of epistemic projects are spurious. I then offer a better characterisation of the various kinds of epistemic projects in which appeal to Moore's Proof can be made and accordingly assess the latter's chances of success.

2010 - Notes on Italian philosophy, peer-reviews and 'la corruttela' [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper argues that the state of the art of Italian philosophy isn't as disparaging as Roberto Farneti has argued in a paper appeared in the same journal and that the policy of having peer-reviews is useful to oppose corrupt academic habits but can't really bestow originality on a paper if it lacks it.

2010 - Scepticism and Justification [CONVEGNO] [Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa; E., Lalumera
abstract

The conference has brought together seven world-wide prominent philosophers on the topic of scepticism and justification: Ernest Sosa (Rutgers), Alan Millar (Stirling), Ralph Wedgwood (Oxford), Jim Pryor (NYU), Pascal Engel (Geneve), Gianfranco Soldati (Fribourg), Annalisa Coliva (Modena & Reggio Emilia).

2010 - Sull'idea stessa di relativismo [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

L'articolo discute la nozione stessa di relativismo e sostiene che i tentativi recenti per renderla coerente sono votati al fallimento

2010 - Was Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist? [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Drawing mostly on Wittgenstein's remarks in "On Certainty", "The Notes on Frazer's the Golden Bough" and in "Culture and Value", the paper argues that, contrary to most interpretations, Wittgenstein should not be regarded as an epistemic relativist. Rather, he should be considered merely an anti-foundationalist.

2010 - Wittgenstein's later philosophy [Voce in Dizionario o Enciclopedia]
Coliva, Annalisa; D., Moyal Sharrock
abstract

The entry lists and comments major bibliographical references on Wittgenstein's later philosophy

2009 - "La filosofia e lo specchio della natura. Trent'anni dopo" [WORKSHOP] [Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Workshop sul libro di Richard Rorty "Philosophy and the mirror of nature" a trent'anni dalla pubblicazione, con i curatori dell'edizione italiana - Gianni Vattimo e Diego Marconi - con particolare riferimento ai temi della veritò, del relativismo e del destino della filosofia

2009 - Cartesio: costitutivismo senza introspezionismo? [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

L'articolo analizza la posizione di Cartesio sulla conoscenza dei propri stati mentali e sostiene che, contrariamente alla vulgata, non si tratta necessariamente di un modello osservazionale, ma, in effetti, del primo esempio di teoria "costitutivista"

2009 - I modi del relativismo [Monografia/Trattato scientifico]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Il libro presenta ed esamina criticamente molti dei modi in cui il relativismo è stato sostenuto, tanto in filosofia quanto in altre discipline, quali la linguistica e l'antropologia e presenta una proposta alternativa tanto al realismo quanto al relativismo, concernente soprattutto l'ambito etico ed epistemico.

2009 - Tu chiamale se vuoi "emozioni" [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

L'articolo propone alcune critiche alle teorie di ispirazione humeana e stoica delle emozioni e sostiene che queste ultime siano da intendersi come stati mentali sui generis non riconducibili né a sensazioni, né a giudizi, né alla somma di questi.

2009 - What kind of entities are concepts? [Relazione in Atti di Convegno]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper defends a Platonistic conception of concepts

2009 - Wittgenstein: philosophy and culture [WORKSHOP] [Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Workshop sul rapporto di Wittgenstein con la cultura del suo tempo e la sua concezione della filosofia con Peter Hacker e Brain McGuinness

2009 - “Self-knowledge and commitments" [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper argues in favour of a new form of constitutivist position with respect to our so-called "knowledge" of our own mental states. It does so by distingishing between attitudinal mental states as commitments and as dispositions and by proposing a minimalist account of psychological concepts' possession. It defends this view from a number of standard criticisms raised in the recent literature on the topic.

2008 - "Il relativismo si dice in molti modi. O forse in nessuno?" [Relazione in Atti di Convegno]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Nell'articolo si sostiene che non vi è una formulazione coerente del relativismo.

2008 - Alcune osservazioni su verità, relativismo, filosofia e dibattito pubblico. Note intorno a "Per la verità" di Diego Marconi [Recensione in Rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

2008 - Recensione di "Il filosofo e i sensi" di A. Paternoster [Recensione in Rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

2008 - Self-knowledge and the Self [CONVEGNO] [Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Convegno internazionale tenutosi al Philosophy Institute London (UK) in maggio sul tema indicato nel titolo. Tra i partecipanti: dagli USA: Carol Rovane, Akeel Bilgrami, John Campbell, Jim Pryor, Dorit Bar-On, Chris Peacocke. Da UK Crispin Wright, Jane Heal, Barry C. Smith, Paul Snowdon. Da CH: Martine Nida-Ruemelin, Gianfranco Soldati. Dall' Italia: Annalisa Coliva

2008 - The paradox of Moore's proof of an external world [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Moore's proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright's nor Pryor's readings of the proof can explain this paradox and show how it is only by taking th proof in connection with Cartesian scepticism that one can explain it.

2008 - Wittgensteinian Uncertainties [CONVEGNO] [Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Convegno internazionale tenutosi a Modena e Bologna in maggio sugli aspetti epistemologici dell'opera di Ludwig Wittgenstein. Relatori: Coliva, Leonardi, Voltolini, Glock (CH), Moyal-Sharrock (UK), Pritchard (UK)

2008 - “Peacocke’s self-knowledge” [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper critically reviews Peacocke's account of self-knowledge and finds it defective.

2007 - Filosofia analitica. Temi e problemi [Curatela]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Capitoli su specifici temi del dibattito contemporaneo in filosofia analitica.

2007 - Lo scetticismo sull'esistenza del mondo esterno [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Un capitolo di presentazione del dibattito contemporaneo sullo scetticismo circa l'esistenza del mondo esterno, nell'ambito della filosofia analitica

2007 - Lo scetticismo sull’esistenza del mondo esterno [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Capitolo sullo scetticismo contemporaneo in ambito analitico

2007 - Prefazione [Filosofia analitica. Temi e problemi] [Prefazione o Postfazione]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

N/A

2007 - Recensione di E. Lalumera, "Concetti e normatività", Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2004 [Recensione in Rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

La recensione offre un sunto e un commento del libro in oggetto.

2007 - Wittgenstein, tra letteratura e scienze umane [CONVEGNO] [Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Convegno tenutosi nell'Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia (entrambe le sedi) sulla rilevanza della riflessione wittgensteiniana per la letteratura e le scienze umane. Tra i partecipanti: A. Birk, W. Huemer, P. Donatelli, E. Esposito, M. Andronico, A. Ginzburg, R. Pujia, F. Pastorini, L. Morra, D. Sparti.

2006 - Error through misidentification: some varieties [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper criticises Pryor's recent distinction between two kinds of immunity to error through misidentification and presents a novel one. It uses the latter to reconcile Evans' and Shoemaker's views on memory-based self-ascriptions, as well as to illuminate the distinction between de facto and logical immunity to error through misidentification.

2006 - I concetti. [Monografia/Trattato scientifico]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Una disamina critica delle principali teorie filosofiche dei concetti, con una difesa della teoria di Peacocke e delle sue conseguenze per il problema del contenuto percettivo.

2006 - Il puzzle della Prova del mondo esterno di Moore [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Il paper sostiene che la prova del mondo esterno di Moore presenta un puzzle: è un argomento perfettamente corretto eppure ci colpisce immediatamente come difettoso. Si sostiene quindi che per spiegare questo puzzle è necessario intendere la prova come una risposta allo scetticismo di tipo cartesiano.

2006 - Paura di conoscere. Contro il relativismo e il costruttivismo [Traduzione di Libro]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Il libro propone una critica serrata di due forme di relativismo: quello fattuale e quello epistemico

2006 - Pensare. Leggi ed errori del ragionamento [Monografia/Trattato scientifico]
Coliva, Annalisa; E., Lalumera
abstract

Elementi di critical thinking su ragionamento deduttivo, induttivo, abduttivo e fallacie argomentative.

2006 - Premessa all'edizione italiana [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Il testo contiene una critica puntuale di alcune forme di relativismo: segnatamente sui fatti ed epistemico

2006 - Self-knowledge: one more constitutive view [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper proposes a now constitutivist account of self-knowledge

2005 - Moore’s paradox and commitments [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper presents a novel solution to Moore's paradox, drawing on the notion of a belief as a commitment.

2004 - I CONCETTI. TEORIE ED ESERCIZI [Monografia/Trattato scientifico]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Disamina delle principali teorie filosofiche dei concetti, con una difesa della teoria di Peacocke e delle sue conseguenze per il problema del contenuto percettivo.

2004 - Proof of an external world: transmission-failure, begging the question or dialectical ineffectiveness?—Moore, Wright and Pryor [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The article describes recent interpretations of Moore's Proof and their assessments of it and proposes a new one.

2004 - WITTGENSTEIN TODAY [Curatela]
Coliva, Annalisa; Picardi, E.
abstract

Essays on different aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy

2003 - "Metafisica dell'io e io pensieri. Ovvero sull'anti-cartesianesimo nella filosofia antica, medievale e soprattutto analitica", [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

L'articolo rintraccia una visione anticartesiana dell'io nell'opera di Sant Tommaso e la pone in relazione con la recente ripresa in filosofia analitica di una concezione anticartesiana dell'io, dovuta soprattutto a Gareth Evans.

2003 - "The first person: error through misidentification, the split between speaker's and semantic reference and the real guarantee" [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper argues for the difference between three phenomena concerning first person thoughts, which are often conflated in the literature on the topic: immunity to error through misidentification, the split between speaker's and semantic reference and what I label "the real guarantee".

2003 - MOORE E WITTGENSTEIN: SCETTICISMO, CERTEZZA E SENSO COMUNE [Monografia/Trattato scientifico]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

Analisi storico filosofica e concettuale delle posizioni epistemologiche di G. E. Moore e Ludwig Wittgenstein

2003 - The problem of the finer-grained content of experience. A redefinition of its role within the debate between McDowell and nonconceptual theorists [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper argues that, once properly construed, the argument from the finer-grained content of colour experience is in fact neutral on the debate between McDowell and nonconceptual theorists about the content of perception.

2002 - "In difesa del contenuto non-concettuale della percezione" [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

L'articolo difende l'idea che le percezioni possano avere un contenuto non concettuale

2002 - On What There Really is to Our Notion of the Ownership of a Thought. A Reply to John Campbell [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper is a reply to John Campbell's criticism of my position regarding what thought insertion may be taken to show with respect to immunity to error throuh misidentification of first person thoughts.

2002 - Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error through Misidentification [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper argues that, contrary to John Campbell's recent view, the phenomenon of thought insertion, witnessed in psychiatric literature, should not be counted as a case against the logical immunity to error through misidentification of introspection-based psychological self-ascriptions.

2001 - SINGULAR THOUGHTS. PERCEPTUAL-DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHTS AND I-THOUGHTS [Monografia/Trattato scientifico]
Coliva, Annalisa; Sacchi, E.
abstract

A defense of a neo-Fregean account of peceptual demonstrative and I-thoughts.

2001 - Wright and McDowell on the Content of Experience and the Justification of Empirical Beliefs [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

The paper argues that Wright's attack on McDowell's position with respect to the content of experience is misguided. Still McDowell's position is found wanting on a number of fronts and hence ultimately rejeced.

2000 - Filosofia del linguaggio. Un'introduzione contemporanea [Traduzione di Libro]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

An introduction to contemporary philosophy of language.

1999 - "Wittgenstein: certezza versus scetticismo e naturalismo" [Capitolo/Saggio]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

L'articolo presenta una critica dell'interpretazione naturalista data da Strawson di "Della certezza" di Wittgenstein.

1997 - Moore: scetticismo e senso comune [Articolo su rivista]
Coliva, Annalisa
abstract

L'articolo propone una ricostruzione storico filosofica e concettuale della posizione che G. E. Moore sviluppò contro l'idealismo e lo scetticismo nei due saggi "La difesa del senso comune" e "La prova del mondo esterno", evidenziandone i limiti.