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Carla BAGNOLI
Professore Ordinario
Dipartimento Educazione e Scienze Umane
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Pubblicazioni
2023
- Individual responsibility under systemic corruption: A coercion-based view
[Articolo su rivista]
Ceva, Emanuela; Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2023
- Normative Isolation: Dynamics of Authority and Power in Gaslighting
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2022
- Agency and Emotions
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2022
- Feeling Wronged: The Value and Deontic Power of Moral Distress
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, C.
abstract
This paper argues that moral distress is a distinctive category of reactive attitudes that are taken to be part and parcel of the social dynamics for recognition. While moral distress does not demonstrate evidence of wrongdoing, it does emotionally articulate a demand for normative attention that is addressed to others as moral providers. The argument for this characterization of the deontic power of moral distress builds upon two examples in which the cognitive value of the victim’s emotional experience is controversial: the case of micro-aggression, and the case of misplaced distress. In contrast to appraisal and perceptual models of distress, it is argued that its epistemic and normative value is dialogical rather than evidential, in that it presses claims that engage the audience in a normative discussion about the normative standing of the claimant, the proper grounds of the attitude, and the normative standards used to assess them.
2022
- Hard Times: self-governance, freedom to change, and normative adjustment
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2022
- Introduction
[Breve Introduzione]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2022
- Time in Action: The Temporal Structure of Rational Agency and Practical Thought
[Curatela]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2021
- Complicità e responsabilità reciproca
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2021
- Disclaiming Responsibility, Voicing Disagreements, Negotiating Boundaries
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2021
- Ethical Constructivism
[Monografia/Trattato scientifico]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Ethical constructivism holds that truths about the relation
between rationality, morality, and agency are best understood as
constructed by correct reasoning, rather than discovered or invented.
Unlike other metaphors used in metaethics, construction brings to light
the generative and dynamic dimension of practical reason. On the
resultant picture, practical reasoning is not only productive but also
self-transforming and socially empowering. The main task of this
Element is to illustrate how constructivism has substantially modified
and expanded the agenda of metaethics by refocusing on rational
agency and its constitutive principles. In particular, this Element
identifies, compares, and discusses the prospects and failures of the
main strands of constructivism regarding the powers of reason in
responding to the challenges of contingency. While Kantian, Humean,
Aristotelian, and Hegelian theories sharply differ in their constructivist
strategies, they provide compelling accounts of the rational articulation
required for an inclusive and unified ethical community.
2021
- One Among Many: responsibility and alienation in mass action
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2021
- Respect and the Dynamics of Finitude
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2021
- The Objective Stance and the Boundary Problem
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2021
- The Practical Significance of the Categorical Imperative
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2021
- The Sources and Stances of Moral Normativity
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2021
- The springs of action in butō improvisation
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2020
- LOVE’S LUCK-KNOT: emotional vulnerability and symmetrical accountability
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, C.
abstract
Pamela Anderson argues for liberating love and vulnerability from the myths of the Western philosophical imaginary that tie them to fragility, subjection, and dependency. Spurred by Judith Butler’s work, Anderson finds herself challenged to rethink her ontological assumptions, away from the Kantian conception of the self as morally and ontologically invulnerable. In (partial) support of Anderson’s agenda, I distinguish different contrastive pairs of concepts of vulnerability, and argue for the relevance of ontological vulnerability, showing that in a Kantian framework this is the root of shared agency. I argue that this–largely unexplored–Kantian claim converges with and sustains Anderson’s general plan to reassess the positive value of vulnerability in relation to mutual accountability. The ontological concept of vulnerability makes the finitude and interdependency of human agency apparent. In this context, love vulnerability can be appreciated and valued as a distinctive drive to cooperative interaction and shared agency, which allows finite and limited agents to deal and cope with the predicaments of contingency. Focusing on the dynamic and reciprocal permeability distinctive of love, I defend the claim that vulnerability to love is not the source of burdens and constraints but a key capacity that shapes human identity, drives and expands agency, and sustains relations of mutual accountability.
2020
- Normativity and Emotional Vulnerability
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Are the emotions relevant for value and normativity? Is there a set of morally correct arrangements
of emotions? Current debates are often structured as though there were only two theoretical
options to these questions: sentimentalism and rationalism. This paper offers a
Kantian account of ‘practical reason’ as the seat of moral agency, which recognizes a
complex relation between reason and the sensibility.
2020
- Practical Knowledge, Equal Standing, and Proper Reliance on Others
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
According to a traditional account, moral cognition is an achievement gained over time
by sharing a practice under the guidance and the example of the wise, in analogy with craft
and apprenticeship. This model captures an important feature of practical reason, that is, its
incompleteness, and highlights our dependence on others in obtaining moral knowledge,
coherently with the socially extended mind agenda and recent findings in empirical psychology.
However, insofar as it accords to exemplars’ decisive authority to determine the standard
of correctness for moral cognition, the model does not offer protection against arbitrariness
and discrimination. The article argues that to understand the socially distributed nature of
practical knowledge, we have to discard the notion of exemplars and reconceive of others as
having equal normative standing. This claim allows us to revisit the conception of autonomy
as key to distributed practical knowledge. While autonomy does not amount to selfsufficiency
and self-reliance, it does demand independence of judgement and stands in contrast
to servility, submission, and other sorts of defective ways of relying on others.
The requirement of equal standing provides the basis for distinguishing between proper and
improper reliance on others.
2020
- Replies
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, C.
abstract
These replies aim to clarify the method and aims of the essay by responding to the objections formulated by Damiano Canale, Massimo Reichlin, and Daniele Santoro.
2020
- Sidgwick and Kant on Practical Knowledge and Rational Action
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2019
- Authority as a contingency plan
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, C.
abstract
Humean constructivists object to Kantian constructivism that by endorsing the constitutivist strategy, which grounds moral obligations in rational agency, this position discounts the impact of contingency in moral life. In response to these charges, I argue that Humeans misrepresent the challenge of contingency and fail to provide adequate resources to cope with it. In its formalist variety, Humean constructivism fails to make sense of an important category of ethical judgments, which claim universal authority. The substantive varieties of Humean constructivism recognize that some ethical judgments aspire to universality, but fail to fully justify such an aspiration. These versions of constructivism represent a setback in regard to the achievements of Kantian constructivism. In conclusion, I briefly resume the advantages of advocating a Kantian conception of rational authority as a response to contingency.
2019
- Ethical objectivity: The test of time
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
According to many, evolutionary accounts of ethics undermine the prospects of its objective foundation. By contrast, this paper argues that such evolutionary accounts discredit only the absolutist construal of moral truths as timeless but supports other conceptions of objectivity as tested by time. Insofar as Kantian constructivism addresses the problem of ethical objectivity from the standpoint of temporal rational agents, it is not vulnerable to debunking arguments based on evolutionary explanations. In fact, recent work on evolutionary accounts of reasoning and inferences not only coheres with but it also reinforces the constructivist conception of practical reason as a problem-solving cooperative device apt to temporal and interdependent rational agents.
2019
- Il paradigma dell’osservatore responsabile
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2019
- Teoria della responsabilità
[Monografia/Trattato scientifico]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2018
- Claiming responsibility for action under duress
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Abstract This paper argues that to understand the varieties of wrongs done in coercion, we
should examine the dynamic normative relation that the coercer establishes with the coerced.
The case rests on a critical examination of coercion by threat, which is proved irreducible to
psychological inducement by overwhelming motives, obstruction of agency by impaired
consent or deprivation of genuine choice. In contrast to physical coercion, coercion by threat
requires the coercee’s participation in deliberation to succeed. For this kind of coercion to be
successful, there must be a normative relation established by the coercer and the coercee, in
which they recognize each other as rational agents. In such cases, the coercee is wronged in the
exercise of her deliberative powers. As a consequence, this form of coercion does not cancel
the coercee’s moral responsibility for coerced action. Reclaiming the coercee’s responsibility
for action under threat does not diminish the visibility and gravity of the coercer’s wrongdoing.
On the contrary, it allows us to capture some features of the coercive relation that otherwise
remain unfocused and thus identify the distinctive ways in which the coercee is wronged.
2018
- Compassion and Practical Reason: the Prospective of the Vulnerable
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This essay distinguishes two concepts of compassion at works in Kant’s ethics. Proximal compassion is a sort of emotional contagion, which interferes with our capacities for rational agency, while distal compassion is active and rational, and key to Kant’s account of duties of virtue. To highlight the respective roles of these two kinds of compassion, the essay centers on a contrast with two distinct models of compassion which are said to sharply depart from Kant. First, Iris Murdoch relates compassion to the appreciation of concrete individuals, objecting that Kant’s discussion of rational agency overlooks individuality, hence canceling the deep differences in moral visions and outlooks. Second, for Theodor W. Adorno, compassion targets the injured and broken lives of vulnerable others, objecting that Kant’s ethics overlooks the genuine moral value of compassion. The argument is that Murdoch’s critique misleads us in objecting to abstraction, while Adorno’s critique places compassion in the right perspective, that is, the perspective of the vulnerable. However, Adorno’s critique is also partly misplaced, insofar as vulnerability is a driving concern in Kant’s theory of practical reason. This argument builds upon recent scholarship to show that the criticisms presented above misdiagnose Kant’s failure to account for compassion as a morally valuable emotion as lack of attention to individual vulnerability. The conclusion is that despite overwhelming critiques, Kant provides us with a useful distinction between two kinds of compassion, which coheres with empirical psychology and succeeds in vindicating the different roles of compassion in moral reasoning.
2018
- Constrained by reason, transformed by love: Murdoch on the standard of proof
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
In ‘Constrained by Reason, Transformed by Love: Murdoch on the
Standard of Proof’ Bagnoli concentrates upon the role of love in
Murdoch’s moral philosophy. She reviews Murdoch’s moral philosophy in
the light of her critique of Kant. Kant, for Murdoch, takes moral life to
be overly determined by reason. Kantian reason is held to be abstract,
divorced from emotion and separated from the concrete world of particularity.
In contrast to Murdoch, Bagnoli sees affinities between the moral
standpoints of Kant and Murdoch, observing how they both refuse to
reduce morality to empiricism. Kant and Murdoch take the proof of
morality to be irreducible to that of non-moral empirical conditions. The
proof of morality for both Kant and Murdoch is held to reside in the
experience of morality; more specifically reason in the case of Kant, and
love in the case of Murdoch. Bagnoli also takes Murdoch to accept Kant’s
critique of classical metaphysics. Bagnoli maintains that Murdoch misreads
Kant in exaggerating the differences between Kant’s moral philosophy
and her own. Kant’s use of reason, for Bagnoli, is not overly abstract
in that he is neither seen to deny a role for feeling nor to divorce reason
from emotion.
2018
- Defeaters and practical knowledge
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This article shows that the problem of defeasibility hinges on a more fundamental issue about the source of authority of moral reasons. It argues that the legitimate source of moral authority is rationality, and that rational justification deploys universal principles. However, normative defeasibility raises important issues about the possibility of practical inferences. As an alternative, a non standard version of Kantian constructivism is defended.
2018
- Emotions and the Dynamics of Reasons
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This paper is a modest, preliminary attempt to set out the problem of the sensitivity
of emotions to time, by considering some ways in which love for someone is
sensitive to the passage of time and affects the dynamics of reasons.
2018
- Reasons in moral philosophy
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, C.
abstract
2018
- Reflective Efficacy
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Review of Neil Sinhababu Humean Nature
2018
- Responsabilità, reciprocità e cooperazione
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This article argues for an account of responsibility as answerability.
2018
- "Sic et non": Justify responsibility
[Articolo su rivista]
Fonnesu, L.; Magni, S. F.; Bagnoli, C.
abstract
2018
- Values
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, C.
abstract
2017
- Constructivism in Meta-ethics
[Voce in Dizionario o Enciclopedia]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Metaethical constructivist theories aim to account for the nature of normative truths and practical reasons. They bear a problematic relation to traditional classifications of metaethical theories. In particular, there are disagreements about how to situate constructivism in the realism/antirealism debate. These disagreements are rooted in further differences about the definition of metaethics, the relation between normative and metaethical claims, and the purported methods pertinent and specific to metaethical inquiry. The question of how to classify metaethical constructivism will be addressed in what follows by focusing on the distinctive questions that constructivist theories have been designed to answer. Section 1 explains the origin and motivation of constructivism. Sections 2–4 examine the main varieties of metaethical constructivism. Section 5 illustrates related constructivist views, some of which are not proposed as metaethical accounts of all normative truths, but only of moral truths. Sections 6 and 7 review several debates about the problems, promise and prospects of metaethical constructivism.
2017
- Kant in Metaethics: The Paradox of Autonomy, Solved by Publicity
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This chapter argues for the centrality of Kant's theory of practical reason for recent debates in metaethics and proposes a constructivist solution to the problem of self-legislation.
2017
- Moral dilemmas
[Voce in Dizionario o Enciclopedia]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Entry on the definition of moral dilemmas and its role in ethical theory.
2017
- Structural modes of recognition and virtual forms of empowerment: Towards a new antimafia culture
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, C.
abstract
2017
- The supervenience dilemma explained away
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
According to an anti-realist argument, realist accounts of supervenience face the following dilemma: either they accept naturalistic reduction, an ontological claim about the nature of normative properties that is incoherent with their defining agenda, or they recognize that their agenda is based on a queer ontology, which is at risk of being unintelligible. In a recent defense of robust moral realism, David Enoch recognizes that this is a serious challenge but argues that it is not a conclusive argument against to moral realism because queerness is after all tolerable. His strategy is to minimize the costs of admitting queerness by focusing on the explanatory role of moral principles, in analogy with law. This is a promising approach to the problem of supervenience, but it is doubtful as strategy. I will show that in favor of moral realism. In fact, if all the explanatory work is done by normative principles, there is nothing for the realist account of supervenience to do.
In this paper, I argue that this debate about normative supervenience rests on a misunderstanding of the role of normative principles. As an alternative, I offer a constructivist explication of the epistemic and ontological role of normative principles, which proves the notion of supervenience to be redundant. The advantage of this constructivist approach to supervenience is that it directly addresses a legitimate demand for an explanation of the function of normative discourse, which is often kept in the background. In providing a response to this demand, this constructivist argument also shows – pace Enoch and others – that an account of practical reasoning is not only pertinent but also essential to successfully address the meta-ethical issue of supervenience.
2016
- Change in view: sensitivity to facts in prospective rationality
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This essay argues for a constructivist account of the fact/value entanglement and its consequences on practical reasoning.
2016
- Kantian Constructivism and the Moral Problem
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This essay provides a defense of Kantian constructivism from standard objections.
2016
- Review of Simon Laden, Reasoning: A Social Picture
[Recensione in Rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
A critical account of Simon Laden's social theory of reasoning.
2016
- Rooted in the Past, Hooked in the Present: Vulnerability to Contingency and Immunity to Regret
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
The perspective of deliberative choice is constitutively from here. This simple truth carries significant implications for our agency and integrity, some of which are the focus of Wallace's thought-provoking essay. Wallace is concerned with the discrepancy between our present attachments and the rational justification of past decisions, which threatens our personal and moral integrity. In what follows, I raise some questions about Wallace's claim that attachments make us immune to regret and, ultimately, about his account of the impact of contingency in our practical thought. My argument revolves around two cases of immunity to regret, due to the agent's attachment to a ground project. Contrary to Wallace, I argue that in these cases the agent's inability to regret that things had not gone otherwise is neither unreasonable nor morally objectionable. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
2016
- Vulnerability and the Incompleteness of Practical Reason
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This essay defends a constructivist account of constitutive vulnerability and specify its role in a relational account of autonomy.
2015
- A Philosophy to Live by: Engaging Iris Murdoch [recensione]
[Recensione in Rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
A critical examination of Maria Antonaccio's interpretation of Iris Murdoch's philosophy, focusing on practical reflection.
2015
- Moral Objectivity: a Kantian Illusion?
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This article offers a Kantian constructivist account of objectivity. Kant’s analysis of
respect is a promising starting point for a phenomenological defense of objectivity. Kant
takes the moral feeling of respect to show that we are responsive to the categorical
demands of morality. Unlike the realist, Kant does not try to demonstrate an ontological
relation between how things appear to us and how they stand independently of us. Rather,
his argument establishes that our experience of morality is congruent with the objectivist
aspirations of morality. This article argues that constructivism best accounts for this
congruence by taking the feeling of respect as the subjective condition of the reality of
practical reason. Surprisingly, this results in a far more ambitious claim than the realist
can defend. While the realist argument is pro tanto, Kantian constructivism purports to
provide a conclusive argument for the objectivity of practical reason. Kantian
constructivism survives Williams’ critique and presents some important advantages over
traditional accounts of the role of moral experience in foundational arguments.
2015
- Reading Onora O’Neill [recensione]
[Recensione in Rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This is a review of 'Reading Onora O’Neill'.
2014
- Desideri e necessità: sull’incompletezza della ragione pratica
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Questo saggio propone un'analisi della categoria di ‘necessità pratica’ di cui parlano i kantiani e che suscita l’avversione degli empiristi. La soluzione che cercherò di delineare, sebbene non nei dettagli, è quella di proporre una concezione dinamica dei desideri, la cui indeterminatezza e eterogeneità sono caratteristiche positive, che indicano la loro malleabilità e educabilità alla ragione. Si sostiene che la ragione pratica
è in un senso importante incompleta e che il suo completamento è storico e sociale, avviene cioè gradualmente attraverso processi e pratiche di socializzazione complessi che hanno come obbiettivo importante la sensibilizzazione alle richieste della ragione.
2014
- L’Autorità degli affetti
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This is an account of the authority of affections vs. the authority of rational justification, in a non-formal social account of practical reasoning.
2014
- Morality as Compromise vs. Morality as a Constraint
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This is a critique of James Sterba's account of the conflict between rationality and morality.
2014
- Ruth Barcan Marcus
[Articolo su rivista]
Duccio, Pianigiani; Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Ruth Barcan Marcus è stata una importante logica e filosofa i cui contributi pionieristici negli anni quaranta hanno dato origine alla logica modale quantificata. La cosiddetta formula Barcan è un assioma assai controverso della logica modale quantificata. Barcan Marcus ha contribuito in modo significativo anche a dibattiti di filosofia della logica riguardo alle implicazioni essenzialiste dell'uso di quantificatori modali, di filosofia del linguaggio (specialmente con i suoi contributi sul riferimento e sui nomi propri), e di meta-etica (specialmente riguardo agli argomenti sulla possibilità del dilemma morale basati sull'assiomatizzazione deontica e sulle implicazioni per il dibattito intorno al realismo morale e la cosiddetta necessità pratica).
2014
- Starting Points: Kantian Constructivism Reassessed
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
G.A. Cohen, and J. Raz object that Constructivism is incoherent because it crucially deploys unconstructed elements in the structure of justification. This paper offers a reply on behalf of constructivism, by reassessing the role of such unconstructed elements. First, it shows that a shared conception of rational agency works as a starting point for the justification, but it does not play a foundational role. Second, it accounts for the unconstructed norm that constrains the activity of construction as constitutive. Finally, on this basis, it draws a contrast between constructivism and foundational methods of ethics, such as deontology and teleology.
2013
- Che fare? Nuove prospettive filosofiche sull'azione
[Curatela]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Volume collettaneo sul costruttivismo kantiano. Con saggi di Christine M. Korsgaard, Stefano Bacin, Carla Bagnoli, Michele Bocchiola, Laura Valentini, Miriam Ronzoni
2013
- Constructivism about practical knowledge
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This is an argument in defense of a constructivist account of practical knowledge, which revolves around the phenomenology of self-reflexivity.
2013
- Constructivism in Ethics
[Curatela]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Are there such things as moral truths? How do we know what we should do?
And does it matter? Constructivism states that moral truths are neither
invented nor discovered, but rather are constructed by rational agents in
order to solve practical problems. While constructivism has become the
focus of many philosophical debates in normative ethics, meta-ethics, and
action theory, its importance is still to be fully appreciated. These new
essays written by leading scholars define and assess this new approach in
ethics, addressing such questions as the nature of constructivism, how
constructivism improves our understanding of moral obligations, how it
accounts for the development of normative practices, whether moral truths
change over time, and many other topics. Authors: T. Baldwin, C. Bagnoli, D. Copp, S. Engstrom, W. Fitzpatrick, N. Hussain, M. Lebar, H. Richardson, O. Sensen, Shah, R. Stern.
2013
- Counting without numbers: a non-aggregative account of the puzzle of altruism
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This is an argument against the role attribute to numbers in dilemmas that arise from conflicting duties to persons.
2013
- Il ruolo epistemico delle norme costitutive
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
L'articolo offre un resoconto del ruolo epistemico delle norme costitutive del ragionamento a sostegno di una concezione costruttivista dell'oggettività. Si propone di illustrare i meriti epistemologici del costruttivismo meta-etico, contro posizioni dogmatiche e scettiche.
2013
- Il valore politico della verità
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This is a Kantian-constructivist account of the value of truth as a response to Paolo Parrini's views.
2013
- Introduction [Constructivism in ethics]
[Breve Introduzione]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This is a critical and original introduction to main claims of constructivism as a metaethical account of noromativity.
2013
- Introduzione [Che Fare? Nuove prospettive filosofiche sull'azione]
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Ampia introduzione sulle varietà del costruttivismo etico e metaetico; le sue origini kantiane; il realismo procedurale; la svolta pratica e la teoria dell'azione; la critica costruttivista al realismo normativo; la questione della definizione di metaetica; la critica dell'approccio semanticista alla metaetica; il ruolo epistemologico delle intuizioni nel costruttivismo.
2013
- Moral Dilemmas
[Voce in Dizionario o Enciclopedia]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This is an entry on moral dilemmas, its sources, phenomenology, normative, epistemological, practical, ontological and logical implications.
2013
- Realismo e costruttivismo nella filosofia morale del XX secolo
[Traduzione in Volume]
Bagnoli, Carla; Luca, Zanetti
abstract
Le origini del costruttivismo e del realismo morale del XX secolo. L'argomento contro il modello epistemologico applicativo dell'etica: John Rawls e Bernard Williams.
2013
- Reason and ethics
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, C.
abstract
This article concerns the role of reason in ethics under three distinct capacities: As the conformity of self-reflective minds to laws, as practical reasoning, and as the domain of normative considerations that make actions and attitudes intelligible and justified. In the first part of the article, I present competing accounts of practical reason and of its requirements, surveying recent debates about dichotomies such as explanatory, normative and operative, subjective and objective, justifying and motivating reasons. In the second part, I defend Kantian constructivism as the view of normativity that best vindicates the practical and reflexive nature of reason.
2013
- Respect and Obligation. The Scope of Kant’s Constructivism
[Relazione in Atti di Convegno]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
A constructivist interpretation of Kant's concept of moral obligation.
2013
- Responsabilità come relazione pratica
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
An argument in defense of responsibility for action, attitude and belief.
2013
- SIFA Mid-term conference "Emotions and Knowledge" [CONFERENZA]
[Altro]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Il convegno ha indagato le complesse connessioni tra emozioni e conoscenza con numerose relazioni di ospiti di fama internazionale. Vi sono state anche sessioni parallele basate su una call for papers, come d'abitudine eni convegni della Società italiana di filosofia analitica
2013
- The moral mind. an invitation to the re-reading of iris murdoch
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, C.
abstract
This article argues that Iris Murdoch opposes non-cognitivism because it fails to take into account dynamic moral phenomena that are key in any adequate philosophical exploration of the moral life, that is, the subjective experience of morality, difference, and change. Murdoch's argument challenges the dichotomies fact/value and cognitive/emotive, and proposes a complex, time-sensitive, dynamic model of the mind which focuses on change and transition. On this dynamic model, ethical objectivity is a personal achievement.
2012
- Emotions and the Categorical Authority of Moral Reason
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, C.
abstract
On a standard rationalist account, moral reasons apply to all rational agents as such, and bind us with categorical authority because their source is 'pure', that is, independent of anything contingent, including our emotions. By contrast, the standard sentimentalist account holds that moral reasons spring from emotions, denies their categoricity, and focuses on their motivational power. Both views fail to capture some important aspects of moral authority. This chapter argues that an adequate explanation of these aspects requires a different philosophical treatment of the role of emotions and their relation to practical reason. It argues for a Kantian account of practical reason, which takes respect as the emotional attitude constitutive of rational agency. On this view, moral reasons have categorical authority insofar as they are subjectively experienced in the guise of respect.
2012
- European Epistemology Network Meeting [MEETING]
[Altro]
Coliva, Annalisa; Paolo, Leonardi; Giorgio, Volpe; Sebastiano, Moruzzi; Bagnoli, Carla; Michele, Palmira
abstract
Incontro annuale dell'European Epistemology Network Modena - Bologna 28-30 giugno 2012
2012
- Kant’s Contribution to Moral Epistemology
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This paper addresses a specific aspect of Kant’s legacy that has been largely disregarded in contemporary ethics, that is, his impact on moral epistemology. Kant’s contribution to ethics is typically discussed under the rubric of normative ethics. Indeed, Kant’s impact on this domain can be hardly exaggerated. If some may be reluctant to credit him with the “invention” of autonomy, nobody can dispute that Kant produced one of the most interesting ethical theories of the western tradition. My purpose in this essay is to suggest that the most innovative aspect of Kant’s ethical theory is not a first-order normative ethics, even though the importance and long-lasting mark of Kant’s ethics of autonomy cannot be questioned. My conviction is that Kant is far less interested in producing a normative ethics, or a system of duties, than he is in the investigation of the proper methodology for ethics and in the nature of moral cognition. In this regard, his main contribution should be registered at the epistemological level. I further argue that this contribution should be taken to consist in a constructivist account of moral cognitions.
This claim may be perplexing in more than one way, since constructivism is often characterized both as a first-order account of moral judgments and as a retreat from epistemological and ontological committments. I think this characterization is misleading in general, and mistaken for Kant’s constructivism in particular. I take Kant’s constructivism to be a methodological claim about the authority and productive function of reason and an epistemological claim about the nature of moral cognitions.
2
2012
- Morality as Practical Cognition
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This article highlights the merits of Stephen Engstrom's attempt of placing Kant’s ethics in the tradition of practical cognitivism,in contrast to intuitionist and anti-realist ways of appropriating Kant’s legacy. In particular, it focuses on two issues: first, the special character ofpractical knowledge—as opposed to theoretical knowledge and craft expertise; and second, the apparent tension between the demands of morality and the requirements of instrumental reason, when this is understood as driven by concerns for happiness, prudence, and personal integrity. In contrast to Engstrom, the Author argues for a form of practical cognitivism that is constructive and importantly refers to the constitutive role of moral sensibility.
2012
- Natura umana, autoriflessività e moralità
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Questo articolo illustra il dibattito recente sulla natura della normatività e propone un argomento a favore del razionalismo pratico in contrapposizione ai tentativi radicali di naturalizzazione dell'etica.
2012
- Reason in Ethics
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This article concerns the role of reason in ethics under three distinct capacities: as the conformity of self-reflective minds to laws, as practical reasoning, and as the domain of normative considerations that make actions and attitudes intelligible and justified. In the first part of the article, I present competing accounts of practical reason and of its requirements, surveying recent debates about dichotomies such as explanatory, normative and operative, subjective and objective, justifying andmotivating reasons. In the second part, I defend Kantian constructivism as the view of normativity that best vindicates the practical and reflexive nature of reason.
2012
- Self-Deception and Agential Authority . Constitutivist Account
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This article takes a constitutivist approach to self-deception, and argues that this phenomenon should be evaluated under several dimensions ofrationality. The constitutivist approach has the merit of explaining theselective nature of self-deception as well as its being subject to moralsanction. Self-deception is a pragmatic strategy for maintaining thestability of the self, hence continuous with other rational activities ofself-constitution. However, its success is limited, and it costs are high: itprotects the agent’s self by undermining the authority she has on hermental life. To this extent, self-deception is akin to alienation andestrangement. Its morally disturbing feature is its self-serving partiality.The self-deceptive agent settles on standards of justification that arelower than any rational agent would adopt, and thus loses grip on heragency. To capture the moral dimension of self-deception, I defend aKantian account of the constraints that bear on self-constitution, andargue that it warrants more discriminating standards of agentialautonomy than other contemporary minimalist views of selfgovernment.
2011
- Constructivism in Metaethics
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This article offers an comprehensive introduction to and a critical assessment of constructivism as a metaethical account of normative truths. It takes into critical account Kant's constructivism, contemporary Kantian varieties of constructivism, Utilitarian, Humean, Aristotelian, and Society-based constructivism (It also includes an extensive bibliography).
2011
- Emotions and the Categorical Authority of Morality
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
The Chapter argues that standard sentimentalist and rationalist theories fail to account for the categorical authority of moral reasons. This is because they take emotions to be either completely separable from or only contingently related to reason. An adequate explanation of moral authority requires a different philosophical treatment of the role of emotions, and of their relation to practical reason. From within a Kantian perspective, it is argued that the experience of moral emotions is constitutive of the exercise of practical reason. The categorical authority of moral reasons does not depend upon, but constitutively impliesmoral emotions.
2011
- Introduction [Morality and the Emotions]
[Breve Introduzione]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This is an introduction to the debates on morality and the emotions that developed since Bernard Williams famous article in 1966, until the current resurgence of interest in the emotions due to the development of the cognitive sciences.
2011
- Moral Perception and Knowledge by Principles
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
The essay focuses on the epistemological import of the model of moral perception by taking into consideration Robert Audi’s recent defense of it. The argument is that Audi’s version of this relation crucially brings into play moral principles, and raises the issue of their distinctive epistemic role. Since the main epistemic purpose of the perceptual model is to account for a non-inferential sort of knowledge, it is unclear what sort of role moral principles can be accorded. Interestingly, many Kantians may agree that not all sorts of moral knowledge are inferential, and reject deonto- logical forms of justification, deductivism, and proceduralism. But they object that intuitionism fails to account for the crucial epistemic role of principles. In particular, they argue to carry on the project of objectively grounding moral knowledge we need a more robust conception of the epistemic role of principles. Key to this dispute is the practice of moral judgment.
2011
- Morality and the Emotions
[Curatela]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This is a collection of articles on morality and the emotions by leading philosophers in the field.
2011
- The Claims of Reason: Engstrom’s account of practical knowledge
[Recensione in Rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2011
- The Exploration of Moral Life
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This is a critical reconstruction of Iris Murdoch's account of action and deliberation.
2010
- Responsibility for Action
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This article argues in defense of the concept of moral responsibility. It shows that the claim that we cannot dispense with the concept of moral responsibility does not force us outside the bounds of the naturalistic construal of reality. Responsibility is a normative dialogical concept. By clarifying the dialogical nature of responsibility and specifying its implications, the reductive pretenses of naturalism are questioned.
2009
- Practical Necessity: the Subjective Experience
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This is a novel constructivist argument for the interpretation of the subjective experience of the objectivity of the moral law in Kant.
2009
- Review of Charles Lamore The Autonomy of Morality
[Recensione in Rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2009
- Review of Christine M. Korsgaard The Constitution of Agency
[Recensione in Rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2009
- Review of Roberto Mordacci Personal Reasons
[Recensione in Rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2009
- The Appeal of Kantian Intuitionism
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This is a critical assessment of Robert Audi's Intuitionism.
2009
- The Mafioso Case: Autonomy and Self-Respect
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This article argues that immoralists do not fully enjoy autonomous agency because they are not capable of engaging in the proper form of practical reflection, which requires relating to others as having equal standing. An adequate diagnosis of the immoralist’s failure of agential authority requires a relational account of reflexivity and autonomy. This account has the distinctive merit of identifying the cost of disregarding moral obligations and of showing how immoralists may become susceptible to practical reason. The compelling quality of reason should not be represented as the capacity to force them to abide by morality on pain of incoherence. Rather, its authority (and objectivity) is shown when it presents them with the prospect of a transition that makes sense for them to undertake.
2008
- European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
[Direzione o Responsabilità Riviste]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2008
- Rispetto, reciprocità e eguaglianza democratica
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Il rispetto come riconoscimento in una prospettiva kantiana, e le sue conseguenze per l'eguaglianza democratica.
2007
- European Journa of Philosophy
[Direzione o Responsabilità Riviste]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2007
- I dilemmi morali e i limiti della teoria etica
[Monografia/Trattato scientifico]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Trattato sulla natura del dilemma morale e le sue conseguenze per la teoria etica.
2007
- Il costruttivismo kantiano
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Sulla concezione costruttivista dell'oggettività.
2007
- Introduction
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, C.
abstract
2007
- Iris Murdoch
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
L'articolo propone una nuova interpretazione meta-etica di Murdoch a proposito dell'oggettività.
2007
- L'autorità della morale
[Monografia/Trattato scientifico]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Questa è una monografia sulle sorgenti di autorità delle norme morali. Si colloca entro il dibattito sulla tensione tra oggettività e normatività.
2007
- Phenomenology of the Aftermath. Ethical Theory and the Intelligibility of Moral Experience
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This is an account of the importance of moral phenomenology for ethical theory. In particular, it examines the role of emotions in the aftermath of moral failures.
2007
- Respect and Membership in the Moral Community
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Some philosophers object that Kant’s respect cannot express mutual recognition because it is an attitude owed to persons in virtue of an abstract notion of autonomy, and invite us to integrate the vocabulary of respect with other persons-regarding concepts or to replace it with a social conception of recognition. This paper argues for a dialogical interpretation of respect as the key-mode of recognition of membership in the moral community. This interpretation highlights the relational and practical nature of respect, and accounts for its governing role over other persons-regarding concepts.
2007
- The Authority of Reflection
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This is a critique of Richard Moran's account of reflection. I argues for a dialogical account of reflection. (With Richard Moran's Reply)
2006
- Breaking Ties
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
It is generally agreed that symmetrical dilemmas are not genuine predicaments but ties that can be broken by a device of chance. By contrast, this paper argues that symmetrical dilemmas are threatening because they force the agent to an arbitrary choice and undermine their authorship on action. By focusing on arbitrariness as the common and peculiar feature of genuine dilemmas, we gain the adequate perspective to assess their significance and their impact on ethical theory.
2006
- Deliberare, confrontare, misurare
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
É opinione ampiamente condivisa che l’incommensurabilità e la commensurabilità sono ipotesi sulla natura del valore che pongono delle condizioni pesanti sulla deliberazione e sulla nostra capacità di compiere scelte ragionate. Pragmatisti e pluralisti si sono adoperati ad argomentare che la commensurabilità non è un requisito necessario alla scelta razionale. In questo articolo si sostiene che vi è un argomento ancora più radicale di quello pluralista e pragmatista secondo il quale la commensurabilità, così come l’incommensurabilità, non sono ipotesi sulla natura del valore, ma sono piuttosto atti costitutivi della valutazione. Questo argomento ci invita a ripensare lo scopo della deliberazione e ci richiede di elaborare un linguaggio valutativo più ricco ed articolato di quello dicotomico a cui ci ha abituato il dibattito sulla commensurabilità del valore.
2006
- Dilemmi Morali
[Monografia/Trattato scientifico]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Questo è un saggio sulla possibilità di dilemmi morali, la natura del valore e la possibilità di giudizi etici determinati. In particolare, si tratta della natura del dilemma morale e delle sue conseguenze per l'integrità sia metafisica sia morale dell'agente.
2006
- European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
[Direzione o Responsabilità Riviste]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2006
- Review of V. Held The Ethics of Care
[Recensione in Rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2005
- Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty. A Kantian Argument
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
The article examines a Kantian argument that there is a strict moral duty to intervene when fundamental human rights are violated. I analyze this duty as comprising two complementary duties, to protect the victims and to coerce the wrongdoer, and defend it by appealing to Kant’s conception of respect for humanity. Contrary to common practice, I argue that these are matter of justice, not of mercy.But a moral case for the duty of armed intervention to protect fundamental human rights should not be confused with a legal case. To claim that there is a moral requirement to intervene is not to claim that there is a legal (and legally sanctioned) requirement to do so. Neither argument yet establishes who has the proper authority to intervene. The duty applies to the universal moral community as such and therefore is everybody’s responsibility. Because this duty concerns the international community as a whole, it should be discharged by that community by institutionalizing its responsibility.
2004
- La mente morale
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Un resoconto critico della teoria della deliberazione di Murdoch.
2004
- Robert Nozick
[Curatela]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This volume is dedicated to the epistemology and metaphysics of Robert Nozick
2003
- Etica
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Introduzione alla filosofia morale
2003
- Respect and Loving Attention
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Kant's account of respect as a mark of moral agency and as the evaluative attitude due to persons has been the target of severe and relentless criticisms. This is a clarification of Kant's conception of respect in response Murdoch's objections that it is inadequate to account for moral relations to others. Although respect and love may concur in the practice of morality and concurrently inform our interactions, they are distinct functions of our moral sensibility and govern our relations in different manners. To confound them, or to opt for one of them at the exclusion of the other, is to deplete the basis of our normative model of personal relations. Despite arguments to the contrary, this is a significant yet neglected part of Kant's legacy that we should reclaim.
2002
- Etica
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Questo capitolo propone una breve storia ragionata dell'etica da G.E. Moore a Korsgaard, con particolare attenzione alla questione dei criteri di oggettività in etica.
2002
- Meaning, Justification, and Reasons
[Curatela]
Bagnoli, Carla; G., Usberti
abstract
This collection includes articles in philosophy of language and meta-ethics.
2002
- Moral Constructivism: A Phenomenological Argument
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This is an argument based on moral experience in favor of constructivism.
2002
- Realism as a Moral Achievement
[Relazione in Atti di Convegno]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
A critical assessment of Iris Murdoch's conception of objectivity
2001
- John Rawls
[Curatela]
E., Baccarini; Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
A collection of articles on the different aspects of John Rawls' philosophy.
2001
- Rawls and the Objectivity of Practical Reason
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
This article argues that Rawls' history of ethics importantly contributes to the advancement of ethical theory, in that it correctly situates Kantian constructivism as an alternative to both sentimentalism and rational Intuitionism, and calls attention to the standards of objectivity in ethics. Bagnoli shows that by suggesting that both Intuitionist and Humean doctrines face the charge of heteronomy, Rawls appears to adopt a Kantian conception of practical reason. Furthermore, Rawls follows Kant in assuming that ethical objectivity can be vindicated only if the productive and constructive powers of reason are acknowledged. Bagnoli accounts for this assumption against the background of Kant's moral psychology, and examines Intuitionist and Humean rejoinders. Contrary to a common view, it is argued that because of its claims on the nature of moral agency and the sovereignty of practical reason, Kantian Constructivism sets the standards of ethical objectivity higher than its alternatives, and is more ambitious and more demanding than the realist conception of objectivity.
2001
- Truth, Invention, and Construction
[Relazione in Atti di Convegno]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
A constructivist account of ethical objectivity.
2000
- Il dilemma morale e i limiti della teoria etica
[Monografia/Trattato scientifico]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
2000
- La pretesa di oggettività in etica
[Capitolo/Saggio]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Un argomento in difesa della concezione costruttivista dell'oggettività in etica.
2000
- Realismo procedurale
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Un resoconto critico del costruttivismo come realismo procedurale.
2000
- Value in the Guise of Regret
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
According to a widely accepted philosophical model, agent-regret is practically significant and appropriate when the agent committed a mistake, or she faced a conflict of obligations. It is argued that this account misunderstands moral phenomenology because does not adequately characterize the object of agent-regret. The object of agent-regret should be defined in terms of valuable unchosen alternatives supported by reasons. The proposed model captures the phenomenological varieties of regret and explains its practical significance for the agent. It shows that agent-regret is a mode of valuing: a way in which the agent expresses and confers value.
1999
- Il dilemma morale e l'integrità
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Un argomento sulla possibilità del dilemma morale e le conseguenze per l'integrità.
1998
- Obblighi speciali in una prospettiva kantiana
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Un argomento per la possibilità di riconoscere obblighi speciali in una prospettiva kantiana.
1995
- Habermas e Rawls: un confronto
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
A comparison between John Rawls and Habermas on political liberalism.
1994
- Il dominio della vita
[Traduzione di Libro]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Dworkin Life's Dominion
1992
- Ragioni Imparziali. La teoria del ragionamento pratico di R.M. Hare dal relativismo all’utilitarismo
[Articolo su rivista]
Bagnoli, Carla
abstract
Una critica alla teoria del ragionamento pratico di R.M. Hare.